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Justice and the Supremacy of Law (1927), io6, note 3, io8, citing Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. 462, 33 L. Ed. 970 (i89o);
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville 6 Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33
Sup. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431 (I9M3). And while a general definition of "legislation" may
be given, its application is difficult. See Prentisv. Atlantic CoastLine Co., 211 U.S. 210,
226, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. i5o (19o8).
It has been held that "the legislative power of a state may control the question of
grades and crossings of its streets," and that a city ordinance requiring a railroad to
construct and maintain a viaduct is valid without notice and hearing. Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. v. Nebraska, 17o U.S. 57, 75, i8 Sup. Ct. 513, 42 L. Ed. 848 (1898). If a municipal
corporation acting under authority delegated by the state legislature need give no
notice and hearing while ordering the construction of a viaduct, it might be argued that
the State Highway Commissioner should be likewise privileged when acting under
power given him by the state legislature, and when giving the same order. This may
have been the reasoning of the dissenting justices in the present case who seemed to
rely entirely on the above decision. In passing an ordinance the municipality is usually
said to be exercising a "legislative" and not a quasi judicial function. See New Orleans
Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U.S. iS, 31, 8 Sup. Ct. 741, 31
L. Ed. 607 (x888); North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 3o6,
313,
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Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195 (i9o8); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. City of

Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 555, 34 Sup. Ct. 364, 366 (I914); cf. Health Departmentof City
of New York v. Rector, r45 N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833 (1895). To exempt similarly the proceedings of the State Highway Commissioner would be to place them in the "legislative" category. The majority opinion in its refusal to do this would seem to indicate
a desire to restrict this use of the word "legislative" as a device for avoiding notice and
hearing.

MISHA RuBIN

Contracts-Impossibility-Frustration-[Ontario].-The defendant corporation
contracted to withdraw from a manufacturers' association and to employ plaintiffs
for one year if plaintiffs would withdraw from their labor union. Immediately upon
the beginning of performance of the contract, the union called a strike in which several
of the contracting employees were intimidated or assaulted. The police failed to give
adequate protection. Plaintiffs worked for a period of time at the end of which the
defendant entered into an agreement with the union and dismissed the plaintiffs because
they were not reinstated by the union. Held, that the defendant was not liable for failing to employ the plaintiffs for one year, there being an implied condition in the agreement that if the existence of an independent shop became impossible, performance
would be excused. Ziger v. Shigfer & Hillman Co., [1933] 2 D.L.R. 691.
Under early common law it was generally stated that a promisor was not excused
from his promise unless he had expressly provided for the contingency rendering performance impossible. Paradinev. Jane,Aleyn 26 (K.B. 1647). Three definite exceptions were soon grafted upon this general rule. i. A change in domestic law will excuse
performance. United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 671 (C.C.D.Neb. 19o4); Baily v. De
Crespigny, 4 Q.B. i8o (1869). 2. The death or illness of a party who has contracted to
render personal service will excuse performance. Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N.Y. 4o (1877);
Poussardv. Spiers & Pond, i Q.B.D. 410 (1876). 3. The desttuction of the subject
matter, without fault of either party, will excuse performance. Stewart v. Stone, 127
N.Y. 500, 28 N.E. 595 (189i); Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B-.& S. 826 (Q.B. 1863).

RECENT CASES
In a few cases the destruction of the expected value of the contract was held to
excuse performance. Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740; Alfred Marks Realty Co. v.
Hotel Hermitage, 17o App. Div. 484, ir6 N.Y.S. 179 (1915). A still further category of
cases, and the one into which the present case must fall, to be sustained, excuses performance where there is a destruction of the means of performance. EarnLine S.S.Co.
v. Sutherland S.S.Co., 254 Fed. 126 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. i918), affd. 264 Fed. 276 (C.C.A.
2d 1920); Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, i56 Pac. 458 (916); Kinzer
Construction Co. v. State, 125 N.Y.S. 46 (Ct.Cl. i9io); Horlock v. Beal, [1r16] 1 A.C.
486. See 3 Williston, Contracts (1920), 3288, § 1935.
If the absence of interference by the union be considered the "means" to performance of the contract, the strike called by the union could be considered a destruction
of such means. But a strike, even though unexpected, does not excuse performance in
other types of contracts. Barry v. United States, 229 U.S. 47, 33 Sup. Ct. 68,, 57 L.
Ed. io6o (x913); Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Seaboard TransportationCo., 154
Fed. go (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), reversed on other grounds, 161 Fed. 99 (C.C.A. 2d
i9o8); but see Geismer v. L.S.& M.S.Ry. Co., 102 N.Y. 563, 7 N.E. 828 (1886). The
strike in the present case must have been not only expected but almost uppermost in
the contemplation of the parties; it was an inevitable result of performance of the
contract. Yet the defendant was excused from performance because of the existence
of the very thing for which in effect it had contracted. The severity of the strike
may have greatly increased the difficulty of performance but such could hardly have
been considered an "unanticipated circumstance" that would excuse performance.
3 Williston, Contracts (1920), 3337, § 1963. But see 47 Harv. L. Rev. 702 (1934).
GEORGE -EMBOLSHEMIER

Corporations-Pre-emptive Rights-Treasury Stock-[New York].-Plaintiff was a
shareholder in the American Metal Co. which held 1,685 of its shares as "treasury
stock." Defendants, directors in the company, without offering to the other shareholders an opportunity to subscribe for a pro ratashare of the treasury stock, turned
o
it all over to themselves at a price of $7 a share, thus obtaining control of the company. The company was thereafter sold to another corporation for a sum equivalent
to about $661 for each share. Plaintiff then sued for damages resulting from defendants' refusal to allow him to subscribe for a pro rata share of the treasury stock.
Held, the plaintiff had a "pre-emptive right" to at least an offer of the stock before the
directors sold it to themselves. Hammer v. IVerner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265 N.Y.S. 172
(1933).
It is well settled that a stockholder, in order to protect his proportionate interest
in the management and assets (which might include a surplus) of the corporation, has
the pre-emptive right to be offered a ratable amount of additional shares in the corporation when issued by the directors. Kingston v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, ii
Del. Ch. 258, ioi Ati. 898 (1917); Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., i86 N.Y. 285, 78
N.E. togo (i9o6); Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation (ist ed. 1932) 144;
Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 186 (1928);
Drinker, The Pre-emptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares, 43
Harv. L. Rev 586 (i93o).
As an exception to this rule, it is generally stated that stockholders have no preemptive right to subscribe to a pro rata share of an issue of treasury stock, i.e., those
shares which have been issued and repurchased by the corporation. Borg v. Interna-

